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Abstract
Background: Empirical evidence on how ownership type affects the quality and cost of medical care is growing,
and debate on these topics is ongoing. Despite the fact that the private sector is a major provider of hospital
services in Greece, little comparative information on private versus public sector hospitals is available. The aim of
the present study was to describe and compare the operation and performance of private for-profit (PFP) and
public hospitals in Greece, focusing on differences in nurse staffing rates, average lengths of stay (ALoS), and Social
Health Insurance (SHI) payments for hospital care per patient discharged.
Methods: Five different datasets were prepared and analyzed, two of which were derived from information
provided by the National Statistical Service (NSS) of Greece and the other three from data held by the three largest
SHI schemes in the country. All data referred to the 3-year period from 2001 to 2003.
Results: PFP hospitals in Greece are smaller than public hospitals, with lower patient occupancy, and have lower
staffing rates of all types of nurses and highly qualified nurses compared with public hospitals. Calculation of ALoS
using NSS data yielded mixed results, whereas calculations of ALoS and SHI payments using SHI data gave results
clearly favoring the public hospital sector in terms of cost-efficiency; in all years examined, over all specialties and
all SHI schemes included in our study, unweighted ALoS and SHI payments for hospital care per discharge were
higher for PFP facilities.
Conclusions: In a mixed healthcare system, such as that in Greece, significant performance differences were observed
between PFP and public hospitals. Close monitoring of healthcare provision by hospital ownership type will be
essential to permit evidence-based decisions on the future of the public/private mix in terms of healthcare provision.
Background
Debate on how hospital ownership type influences the
quality and cost of healthcare
Debate on the effects of hospital ownership type on the
quality and costs of medical care has continued for years
[1,2]. Pro-private-care advocates argue that involvement
of the private sector in healthcare provision affords a fast
and innovative response [3], aggressive and creative ful-
fillment of customer demands [4,5], and a high quality of
care [3-6] at competitive prices [4], whereas public health
services are inequitable and inefficient towing to bureau-
cracy, politicization, lack of health worker incentives [7],
and resource limitations [1], especially in times of fiscal
austerity [8].
Conversely, some claim that, in modern society, some
aspects of life are off-limits to commerce and, of these,
“healthcare is too precious, intimate and corruptible to
entrust to the market” [9]. Such critics voice several argu-
ments and concerns. They claim that for-profit organiza-
tions have a strong incentive to engage in opportunistic
behavior, especially in a context of informational asymme-
try [10]. For example, lack of knowledge renders patients
unable to assess the technical quality of services [11,12],
making it possible for profit-maximizing companies to
misrepresent and undersupply hard-to-monitor aspects of
quality of care [2,13,14], to increase profits. Additionally, it
has been argued that for-profit facilities tend to offer ser-
vices at higher prices and to receive higher payments
either owing to exploitation and induced demand [15-17]
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executive incomes and meticulous attention to financial
profit [9,18]. On the other hand, public nonprofit facilities
are perceived as offering low-price services because such
facilities enjoy tax exemptions [19] and have significantly
lower administrative costs [20]. At the same time, because
profit is not the key motive, quality assurance and patient
safety are thought to be assured [2,21].
Against such a background, some authors have con-
cluded that economic theory is ambiguous and does not
clearly show a relationship between ownership and quality
of care [22]. Others highlight that, as the pressures on
nonprofit and for-profit facilities increase in an environ-
ment of enhanced competition, any variation in cost-effi-
ciency (for example, in terms of price [23] or the cost of
uncompensated care [24]) between public and private
facilities becomes significantly reduced or even reversed.
Evaluation of health care providers by ownership type:
International evidence
Comparative quality evaluation is a common research
practice especially in countries such as the USA where
the private sector plays an important role in the health-
care system [25,26]. Studies from the USA have sought
to compare the performance of nonprofit and for-profit
healthcare providers. In most instances, the performance
of nonprofit facilities (general and psychiatric hospitals,
dialysis units, and nursing homes) was better in terms of
mortality rate, health outcomes, cost, and charitable care
than was that of their for-profit counterparts [25-31].
In Europe, relevant evidence on the comparative per-
formance of public and for-profit health providers is lim-
ited and inconclusive. For example, in the UK, evidence
shows that Independent Sector Treatment Centers pro-
vide poor-quality data [32,33] and cherry-pick low-risk
patients [33-35], compared with NHS hospitals. In Ger-
many, private for-profit (PFP) hospitals are less efficient
than public institutions [36,37]. This may be related
either to the lack of teaching activities (thus affording
less clinical experience to staff [36]) or to the higher aver-
age length of stay, probably attributable to patient exploi-
tation [37]. Data from Spain and Italy reveal that
cesarean section rates are significantly higher in private
clinics compared with public hospitals [38-41] because
the financial imperative of the private sector directly or
indirectly influences clinical decisions [39]. Additionally,
empirical evidence from inpatient psychiatric facilities in
Italy shows that private providers offer a lower equivalent
full-time staffing level per bed [42] and have a higher
average length of patient stay [42,43]. These features
reflect facility ownership status rather than patient symp-
t o ms e v e r i t y[ 4 3 ] .R e c e n te v i d e n c ef r o mn u r s i n gh o m e s
in Italy and Sweden shows that private elderly care provi-
ders are more efficient [44], are associated with less
employees per resident [45] and seem to emphasize ser-
vice aspects rather than structural prerequisites for good
care [45] compared to public facilities. Finally, in Catalo-
nia, no statistically significant difference in surgical mor-
tality was observed between public and private open-
heart surgery centers [46]. Although such evidence is
generally in line with results from the US healthcare sys-
tem, the data are few, surprisingly indicating that, in
most European countries, comparative performance eva-
luation is not yet well developed as a research and policy
practice.
Evaluating public and PFP healthcare providers in Greece:
The evidence to date
Despite the fact that the private sector is a major provi-
der of outpatient and hospital services in Greece, little is
known about the performance of this sector compared
with that of public facilities. The rate for example of
cesarean sections is 15-27% higher, depending on the
study, in private than in public maternity hospitals
[47,48]. Responsiveness of the private health sector is bet-
ter than that of the public sector in terms of waiting time,
waiting lists, and patient accommodation [49]. Finally, a
recent study comparing PFP and public dialysis units in
Greece found that the former were overall more efficient
than the latter [50].
The aim of the present study was to describe and com-
pare the operation and performance of PFP and public
hospitals in Greece, focusing on differences between
nurse staffing rates, average lengths of stay (ALoS), and
SHI payment per discharge. Such differences can provide
useful information on the current performance of hospi-
tal service providers by ownership type and thus assist
health policy makers to select the appropriate public/pri-
vate mixture, and the future roles for the two sectors in a
mixed healthcare system, such as that of Greece.
Methods
Data collection
To describe and compare, on a national level, the opera-
tion and performance of PFP and public hospitals, five
different datasets were used. Two datasets contained
information derived from the National Statistical Service
(NSS) of Greece and three gathered data from the three
largest SHI funds in the country. All datasets cover the 3-
year period from 2001 to 2003.
The NSS data were collected using two surveys (the
Annual Hospital Survey and the Annual Patients Dis-
charged Survey) conducted on a yearly basis by the NSS
Section of Health, Welfare, and Social Insurance Statistics.
Both surveys employ questionnaires completed on a man-
datory basis by all hospital providers in the country. The
results are made public, separately, with delays of 2 and 4
years, respectively. Until recently, data from both surveys
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most recent NSS health and social welfare survey data
appeared in 2004; the 1998 data were included [51]. The
NSS information contains: (a) the numbers of hospitals,
hospital beds, and hospital departments evaluated; (b) the
numbers of patients discharged by hospital ownership
type, capacity, specialty, and location; and, (c) the numbers
of medical, nursing, and auxiliary staff by hospital specialty
and location [51]. For the purposes of our study, NSS, fol-
lowing our written requests, provided all data from the
unpublished 2001-2003 surveys (the Annual Hospital and
Annual Patients Discharged Surveys for the 3 years) as
well as additional not-intended-for-publication data (gath-
ered in the same surveys) on numbers of nursing staff and
days of hospitalization by hospital ownership type, speci-
alty, and location. The data contained only aggregate
information by hospital ownership type, specialty, and
location. No hospital- or patient-level information was
available.
The SHIs of Greece provide mandatory healthcare cov-
erage, organized on an occupational basis. In 2003, 35 dif-
ferent SHI funds were operating in the country, financed
via employer and employee contributions and state subsi-
dies [52]. In some instances, SHI funds run their own pri-
mary care and hospital facilities, but, in most cases,
services to beneficiaries are provided via contractual
arrangements with public and private healthcare providers.
In return, SHI funds compensate contracted primary care
providers on a fixed (by the state) fee-for-service basis and
hospital providers on a fixed per diem basis, plus addi-
tional fee-for-service payments (excluded from the per
diem fee) for specific diagnostic and therapeutic proce-
dures (such as CT and MRI scans) performed during
hospitalization.
No official SHI information system, capable of generat-
ing comprehensive data on resource flows and the perfor-
mance of either public or private contracted providers,
exists. All SHI schemes produce (annually) only provi-
sional, aggregated data on beneficiary numbers, and
expected revenue and expenditure for the forthcoming fis-
cal year [52]. Additionally, some funds separately publish
balance sheets, with delays of 2-5 years [53,54], depending
on the capacity of each fund to monitor contracted provi-
ders and expenses and to collect and process the relevant
data. No disaggregated inf o r m a t i o no no u t g o i n g so r
payments is given; it is thus not possible to identify the
ownership type of contracted providers. In other words,
each SHI fund uses individualized policy and methodology
for collection of data, processes the information very
slowly, and does not explore potential efficiency differ-
ences between public and private contractors.
For the purposes of the present study, were performed a
3-year survey (from June 2005 to June 2008) involving the
three largest SHI schemes in Greece. These are (a) the
Institution of Social Security (IKA) which insures urban
blue- and white-collar workers and their dependents; (b)
the Organization of Agricultural Insurance (OGA) which
insures farmers and others living in rural areas; and, (c)
the Greek Professionals and Tradesmen Fund (TEBE)
which insures employers, the self-employed, and their
dependents. In 2003, these three schemes had more than
8.9 million beneficiaries, thus offering healthcare coverage
to 85% of the Greek population [52]. The Statistical
Departments of these three SHI funds (in response to
multiple visits and written requests/questionnaires) pro-
vided us with annual accounting data covering the fiscal
years 2001-2003, covering payments for hospital care,
numbers of beneficiaries hospitalized, and numbers of
days of hospitalization, all by contracted hospital provider
ownership type. All data collected pertained to hospitals
separated by ownership type and specialty-level aggregate
information. No hospital- or patient-level information was
available.
Data analysis
Descriptive statistical analysis of relevant indicators
(including hospital bed density by 1, 000 population, aver-
age hospital bed capacity, and average hospital occupancy
rate), was performed using NSS data. Three additional
indicators (nurse staffing density by hospital bed, average
length of patient stay, and SHI payment per patient dis-
charged), using both NSS and SHI data, were calculated,
further analyzed, and used for comparative evaluation of
PFP and public hospitals. Statistical comparisons between
indicators (differences or ratios) were performed using the
Confidence Interval Analysis (CIA) statistical package [55].
Results
PFP and public hospital characteristics
As shown in Table 1, PFP hospitals comprised 179 pri-
vate clinics in 2003, representing 28.1% of the hospital
beds of Greece. The majority of private clinics are of
small- or medium-bed capacity (in 2003, 75.4% of PFP
clinics had fewer than 100 beds per clinic) despite the
fact that during the period examined many small units
closed (77.5% of PFP clinics had fewer than 100 beds in
2001). In contrast, the number of larger private sector
units (> 100 beds per clinic) remained steady. Most pri-
vate clinics are general and psychiatric facilities, and the
last showed a clear tendency to increase in number dur-
ing the period examined (thus, between 2001 and 2003,
PFP psychiatric hospital beds as a total of PFP beds
increased by 2.2 percentage points).
In 2003, the PFP hospital sector serviced more than
356, 000 patients, thus 18.4% of all hospital patients dis-
charged (Table 1). During 2001-2003, PFP clinics showed
an increase in productivity; the mean annual rise in
the number of patients discharged was 4.4% per year.
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2001 2002 2003
PUBLIC PFP PUBLIC PFP PUBLIC PFP
Hospitals, n 139 191 141 179 142 179
Hospital beds, n (% total hospital beds in Greece)* 36, 186 (69.2) 15, 038 (28.8) 36, 142 (69.8) 14, 460 (27.9) 35, 814 (69.2) 14, 528 (28.1)
Hospital beds per 1, 000 population 3.30 1.37 3.29 1.32 3, 25 1, 32
Average hospital bed capacity 260 79 256 81 252 81
Hospitals by hospital bed capacity, n (%)
1-40 beds 11 (7.9) 76 (39.8) 13 (9.2) 67 (37.4) 14 (9.9) 67 (37.4)
41-100 beds 24 (17.3) 72 (37.7) 26 (18.4) 69 (38.6) 26 (18.3) 68 (38.0)
100-500 beds 86 (61.9) 43 (22.5) 84 (59.6) 43 (24.0) 85 (59.9) 44 (24.6)
> 500 beds 18 (12.9) 0 (0.0) 18 (12.8) 0 (0.0) 17 (12.0) 0 (0.0)
Hospital beds by hospital specialty, n (%)
General 26, 193 (72.4) 7, 492 (49.8) 26, 753 (74.0) 7, 343(50.8) 27, 114 (75.7) 7, 215 (49.7)
Mixed 0 (0.0) 1, 370 (9.1) 0 (0.0) 998 (6.9) 0 (0.0) 979 (6.7)
Maternity 384 (1.1) 1, 007 (6.7) 384 (1.1) 930 (6.4) 384 (1.1) 906 (6.2)
Psychiatric 5, 631 (15.6) 4, 386 (29.2) 5, 561 (15.4) 4, 392 (30.4) 4, 929 (13.8) 4, 567 (31.4)
Pediatric 1, 517 (4.2) 46 (0.3) 1, 529 (4.2) 77 (0.5) 1, 512 (4.2) 74 (0.5)
Other specialty† 2, 461 (6.8) 737 (4.9) 1, 915 (5.3) 720 (5.0) 1, 875 (5.2) 787 (5.4)
Patients discharged, n (% all patients discharged)* 1, 444, 743 (80.1) 327, 175 (18.2) 1, 499, 464 (79.8) 334, 760 (17.8) 1, 533, 030 (79.0) 356, 295 (18.4)
Patients discharged by hospital specialty, n (%)
General 1, 271, 624 (88.0) 230, 468 (70.4) 1, 345, 272 (89.7) 249, 392 (74.5) 1, 380, 384 (90.0) 269, 992 (75.8)
Mixed 0 (0.0) 49, 136 (15.0) 0 (0.0) 35, 176 (10.5) 0 (0.0) 34, 312 (9.6)
Maternity 19, 376 (1.3) 27, 440 (8.4) 19, 896 (1.3) 28, 072 (8.4) 19, 880 (1.3) 28, 632 (8.0)
Psychiatric 12, 868 (0.9) 9, 691 (3.0) 14, 140 (0.9) 9, 720 (2.9) 14, 912 (1.0) 9, 935 (2.8)
Pediatric 72, 192 (5.0) 296 (0.1) 69, 376 (4.6) 432 (0.1) 66, 576 (4.3) 2, 280 (0.6)
Other specialty† 68, 683 (4.8) 10, 144 (3.1) 50, 780 (3.4) 11, 968 (3.6) 51, 278 (3.3) 11, 144 (3.1)
Patients discharged by patient insurance scheme, n (%)
IKA 516, 056 (35.7) 125, 474 (38.4) 524, 836 (35.0) 154, 540 (46.2) 566, 719 (37.0) 168, 236 (47.2)
OGA†† 543, 408 (37.6) 18, 458 (5.6) 483, 125 (32.2) 20, 952 (6.3) 203, 041 (13.2) 20, 719 (5.8)
TEBE 67, 594 (4.7) 10, 575 (3.2) 68, 446 (4.6) 13, 661 (4.1) 64, 931 (4.2) 16, 981 (4.8)
Other insurance scheme‡ 317, 685 (22.0) 172, 668 (52.8) 423, 057 (28.2) 145, 607 (43.5) 698, 339 (45.6) 150, 359 (42.2)
Average hospital (all specialties) occupancy rate 81.8% 60.9% 82.4% 68.9% 101.4% 65.5%
Average general hospital occupancy rate 79.3% 50.7% 81.4% 60.7% 82.1% 61.0%
PFP: Private For-Profit. *All public, private for-profit and private not for-profit hospitals are included; military hospitals are not included.
† Other Specialty: Includes surgical clinics, eye clinics, oncology hospitals, dermatological hospitals, and infectious disease hospitals.
†† The decline in OGA beneficiaries discharged from public hospitals during 2002-2003 is a logistical consequence rather than an actual fact. Between March 2002 and December 2004 the Greek government erased
the debt of OGA to public hospitals; this amounted to 941 million Euros.
‡ Other Insurance Schemes: includes patient beneficiaries of 32 Social Health Insurance Schemes, patients insured with Private Health Insurance Schemes, and the uninsured.
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1In addition, occupancy increased from 60.9% in 2001 to
65.5% in 2003. Three of every four patients discharged
from the private sector were hospitalized in general PFP
clinics, whereas single-specialty private clinics (maternity
and psychiatric) absorbed a large proportion of all
patients discharged from single-specialty hospitals; in
2003, for example, 59.0% and 40.0% of patients dis-
charged from maternity and psychiatric hospitals, respec-
tively, had been treated in the PFP sector. Finally, in
2003, 57.8% of all patients discharged from private clinics
were beneficiaries of the 3 largest (of 35 in all) public
insurance schemes (IKA, OGA, and TEBE); this had
increased by 10.6 percentage points from 2001 to 2003.
Table 1 shows that there were 142 public hospitals in
2003, representing 69.2% of all hospital beds and
absorbing 79.0% of all hospitalizations. Compared with
PFP clinics, public hospitals are larger (with an average
bed capacity of 252 beds per hospital in 2003), have
higher occupancy rates (82.1% for general public hospi-
tals in 2003), and show, during the period examined, a
lower mean annual increase in the number of patients
discharged (3.0% per year) compared with their private
counterparts.
Performance comparison of PFP and public hospitals
The NSS data (Table 2) showed that, in 2003, the num-
ber of nurses per hospital bed in PFP hospitals was 0.55,
t h u sa p p r o x i m a t e l yo n en u r s ef o re v e r yt w ob e d s .T h e
lowest numbers in the private hospital sector were
observed in psychiatric and special surgery facilities
(0.26 and 0.33 nurses per bed, respectively, in 2003).
Depending on the year studied, 57.2-60.9% of nurses
working in the private sector were poorly qualified (with
0-2 years of training).
In the public hospital sector (Table 2), the number of
nurses per hospital bed in 2003 was 1.06. In all years
examined and over all hospital specialties, both all-nurse
and highly qualified nurse staffing densities per hospital
bed were higher than in PFP clinics. However, between
2001 and 2003, the public/PFP divergence in nurse staff-
ing rates was reduced because the mean annual increase
in nurse numbers was higher in PFP hospitals than in
public facilities (from 2001-2003 the mean annual
increase in nurse numbers in PFP hospitals was 4.6% per
year; the corresponding figure for public hospitals was
3.6% per year). Finally, the largest public/PFP differences
in nurse-per-bed figures were observed in specialty and
psychiatric units; in 2003, for example, the numbers of
nurses per public/PFP hospital bed were 2.67 and 2.28,
respectively.
An analysis of ALoS in PFP and public hospitals is
shown in Table 3. We used NSS data to this end; infor-
mation is included on all patients hospitalized in PFP and
public hospitals regardless of insurance status. We found:
(a) a higher unweighted ALoS in general and specialized
(mainly surgical) PFP hospitals compared with public
facilities; and, (b) a lower unweighted ALoS for mater-
nity, psychiatric, and pediatric PFP clinics compared with
their public counterparts. Calculations using SHI data,
which include only patients/beneficiaries of the three
largest SHI schemes in the country, showed that, in all
years studied and among all hospital specialties,
unweighted ALoS was significantly higher in PFP clinics
compared with public hospitals.
Finally, Table 4 summarizeso u rr e s u l t so nS H Ip a y -
ments by hospital ownership type. The SHI data showed
that, from 2001 to 2003, the three largest insurance
schemes paid more than 765 million Euros to contracted
private clinics. Depending on the year studied, payments
to private clinics represented 18.7-29.1% of total hospital
expenditure by SHIs. For OGA and TEBE, for which the
relevant disaggregated information was available (data
not presented in Table 4), fixed per diem fees in 2003
represented 48.4% and 17.0%, respectively, of total
payments to private clinics; the rest constituted fee-for-
service payments for procedures and examinations per-
formed during hospitalization. In contrast, fixed per diem
fees represented larger proportions of total payments by
OGA and TEBE to public hospitals (57.4% and 48.7%,
respectively, in 2003).
As shown in Table 4, in all years examined, over all hos-
pital specialties and for all insurance schemes included in
our study sample, SHI payments (including per diem fee,
plus additional fee-for service payments for services pro-
vided during hospitalization) for hospital care per dis-
charge were higher in PFP clinics than in public hospitals.
Discussion
According to the results of our study significant perfor-
mance differences exist between PFP and public hospi-
tal-care providers operating within the mixed healthcare
system in Greece. PFP hospitals have lower bed capacity,
lower occupancy rates and lower nurse (total and high-
qualified) staffing rates compared to public hospitals
and are associated with higher unweighted length of
stay and higher payments per discharge, at least in the
case of discharged patients that are beneficiaries of the
Greek SHI funds.
Most of our findings are in line with empirical evidence
from other developed countries, but are here highlighted
for the first time in the case of Greece. The data have long
been neglected by health policy analysts and decision
makers. The data collected and analyzed came from a
wide range of official sources, organizations, and depart-
ments within organizations, and covered all hospital provi-
ders in Greece, with the exception of the few private
nonprofit (charitable) providers. Additionally, the datasets
used in our study have remained unexplored for years
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Page 5 of 11Table 2 Nurse staffing levels by hospital ownership type
2001 2002 2003
PUBLIC PFP PUBLIC PFP PUBLIC PFP
RATIO PUBLIC/PFP 95% CI RATIO PUBLIC/PFP 95% CI RATIO PUBLIC/PFP 95% CI
Nurses per hospital bed,
by hospital specialty
General 1.08 0.63 1.71 1.66, 1.76 1.15 0.71 1.63 1.59, 1.68 1.16 0.74 1.57 1.52, 1.61
Mixed - 0.48 - - - 0.55 - - - 0.59 - -
Maternity 0.84 0.53 1.57 1.36, 1.80 0.95 0.58 1.63 1.42, 1.87 0.92 0.61 1.51 1.32, 1.73
Psychiatric 0.49 0.24 2.02 1.88, 2.17 0.51 0.26 1.97 1.84, 2.11 0.59 0.26 2.28 2.13, 2.44
Pediatric 0.96 0.46 2.11 1.37, 3.42 0.98 0.73 1.34 1.03, 1.79 0.98 0.73 1.35 1.03, 1.80
Other specialty* 0.95 0.33 2.90 2.54, 3.33 0.86 0.31 2.76 2.40, 3.18 0.88 0.33 2.67 2.30, 3.05
Total 0.97 0.48 2.01 1.96, 2.07 1.03 0.53 1.93 1.89, 1.98 1.06 0.55 1.93 1.88, 1.97
Nurses per hospital bed,
by nurse training level
RNs† 0.39 0.19 2.07 1.99, 2.16 0.42 0.23 1.86 1.79, 1.93 0.44 0.22 2.00 1.92, 2.07
LPNs†† 0.39 0.17 2.28 2.19, 2.38 0.45 0.22 2.04 1.96, 2.12 0.44 0.24 1.88 1.81, 1.95
Aides‡ 0.19 0.12 1.55 1.47, 1.63 0.16 0.08 1.87 1.76, 1.99 0.18 0.09 1.89 1.78, 2.01
Total 0.97 0.48 2.01 1.96, 2.07 1.03 0.53 1.93 1.89, 1.98 1.06 0.55 1.93 1.88, 1.97
DIFFERENCE PUBLIC - PFP 95% CI DIFFERENCE PUBLIC - PFP 95% CI DIFFERENCE PUBLIC - PFP 95% CI
Nurses by training level,
% total nursing staff
RNs† 40.3 39.1 1.1 -0.1, 2.3 41.1 42.8 -1.6 -2.9, -0.4 41.5 40.1 1.4 0.2, 2.6
LPNs†† 40.2 35.5 4.8 3.5, 6.0 43.5 41.3 2.2 1.0, 3.4 41.9 43.0 -1.1 -2.3, 0.1
Aides‡ 19.5 25.4 -5.9 -7.0, -4.8 15.3 15.9 -0.5 -1.5, 0.3 16.6 16.9 -0.3 -1.2, 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PFP: Private for-profit *Other specialty: Includes surgery clinics, eye clinics, oncology hospitals, dermatological hospitals, and infectious disease hospitals.
†RNs: registered nurses (3 or 4 years training) ††LPNs: licensed nurses (2 years training) ‡Aides: nonprofessional staff.
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1Table 3 Length of patient stay by hospital ownership type
2001 2002 2003
PUBLIC PFP PUBLIC PFP PUBLIC PFP
RATIO PFP/PUBLIC 95% CI RATIO PFP/PUBLIC 95% CI RATIO PFP/PUBLIC 95% CI
Unweighted length of stay,
by hospital specialty†
General 5.96 6.01 1.008 1.007, 1.010 5.91 6.52 1.105 1.103, 1.107 5.89 5.95 1.011 1.009, 1.013
Mixed - 4.80 - - - 9.22 - - - 4.01 - -
Maternity 4.60 4.56 0.991 0.982, 0.999 4.90 4.40 0.898 0.891, 0.906 4.74 4.13 0.871 0.863, 0.878
Psychiatric 160.51 131.04 0.816 0.815, 0.818 133.41 131.17 0.983 0.981, 0.985 282.09 139.10 0.493 0.492, 0.494
Pediatric 4.66 5.59 1.200 1.143, 1.259 5.14 2.81 0.548 0.518, 0.580 4.97 3.37 0.678 0.662, 0.693
Other specialty* 10.66 31.84 2.988 2.976, 3.001 11.52 23.75 2.061 2.052, 2.071 9.66 19.78 2.048 2.038, 2.059
Total 7.48 10.21 1.366 1.364, 1.367 7.25 10.86 1.498 1.496, 1.500 8.65 9.75 1.127 1.126, 1.129
Unweighted length of stay,
by patient insurance scheme
and by hospital specialty††
IKA
General 5.68 9.09 1.601 1.597, 1.605 5.05 8.23 1.630 1.626, 1.633 4.89 8.84 1.810 1.806, 1.814
Psychiatric 36.52 47.45 1.299 1.293, 1.305 40.22 80.13 1.992 1.984, 2.001 41.62 60.62 1.457 1.450, 1.463
All specialties‡ 6.10 14.59 2.392 2.388, 2.396 5.46 15.48 2.833 2.828, 2.838 5.27 15.30 2.903 2.899, 2.908
OGA
Acute hospitals 4.19 7.37 1.760 1.749, 1.770 4.01 7.25 1.808 1.798, 1.818 4.30 6.71 1.561 1.552, 1.571
Long-term care hospitals 28.54 139.41 4.885 4.868, 4.901 23.66 138.78 5.865 5.845, 5.884 22.51 131.07 5.822 5.803, 5.841
All specialties 6.96 29.29 4.206 4.194, 4.218 6.26 28.39 4.533 4.520, 4.545 9.56 29.26 3.062 3.053, 3.070
TEBE
All specialties 4.08 6.80 1.668 1.654, 1.682 3.98 4.59 1.151 1.142, 1.162 3.82 4.27 1.116 1.106, 1.125
Total (IKA, OGA, TEBE) 6.39 15.81 2.473 2.469, 2.476 5.73 16.12 2.815 2.811, 2.819 6.20 15.80 2.548 2.544, 2.551
PFP: Private for-profit, Length of Stay: Days, *Other specialty: Includes surgery clinics, eye clinics, oncology hospitals, dermatology hospitals, and infectious disease hospitals.
†LoS refers to all patients discharged from public and PFP hospitals, regardless of insurance status, according to NSS data.
††LoS refers only to patients discharged from public and PFP hospitals who were beneficiaries of the three SHI schemes included in our sample, according to SHI data.
‡ Distinctions between hospitals by specialty differ between the SHI and NSS datasets.
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1Table 4 Social Health Insurance fund payments for care by hospital ownership type
2001 2002 2003
PUBLIC PFP TOTAL PUBLIC PFP TOTAL PUBLIC PFP TOTAL
SHI payments for hospital care,
millions of € (%)
897.8 (81.3) 206.9 (18.7) 1104.6 (100.0) 832.7 (76.8) 251.4 (23.2) 1084.2 (100.0) 747.6 (70.9) 307.0 (29.1) 1054.6 (100.0)
RATIO PFP/
PUBLIC
95% CI RATIO PFP/
PUBLIC
95% CI RATIO PFP/
PUBLIC
95% CI
SHI payments for hospital care
per patient discharged, €
IKA 877.1 1298.5 1.481 1.480, 1.481 783.8 1234.7 1.575 1.574, 1.576 919.7 1447.7 1.574 1.573, 1.575
OGA 743.6 1786.9 2.403 2.400, 2.405 786.9 2169.2 2.757 2.754, 2.759 900.9 2101.3 2.333 2.330, 2.335
TEBE 607.3 1036.9 1.707 1.706, 1.708 602.0 1109.6 1.843 1.842, 1.844 669.2 1170.5 1.749 1.748, 1.750
Total (IKA, OGA, TEBE) 796.6 1338.9 1.681 1.680, 1.682 773.6 1329.2 1.718 1.717, 1.719 895.6 1490.6 1.664 1.663, 1.665
PFP: Private for-profit
SHI: Social Health Insurance
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1because the existence of these data were unknown to gov-
ernment health policy agencies and, in some instances,
even to the central administrative bodies of relevant
organizations.
Our findings show that the private sector plays a key
role in the provision of hospital services in the country.
T h em a j o r i t yo fs u c hi n s t i t u tes remain small- and med-
ium-bed capacity facilities, with low occupancy rates,
highly dependent on public SHI funds. Earlier studies had
shown that in Greece the probability of treatment in a pri-
vate hospital is positively related to high family income
and to the existence of private health insurance coverage
[56]. Our study confirms these findings since the benefici-
aries of the three largest public sickness funds - mainly
coming from low and middle income classes - that corre-
spond to 85% of the Greek insured population, represent
only 6 out of 10 patients treated in private clinics.
The PFP hospital market has undergone several struc-
tural changes over the past two decades. In the interval
since 1996, increased competition has forced many
small and single-specialty clinics into bankruptcy and
closure. Others have formed powerful companies (via
mergers and acquisitions) owning several small facilities
as well as a few luxurious units of high-bed capacity and
high occupancy rates; these facilities cater for (princi-
pally) private patients and beneficiaries of private health-
care insurance [57]. Such developments within the
private healthcare market have increased the heteroge-
neity of private hospital providers, a fact only partly
reflected in the findings of our current research.
The performance of PFPs and public hospitals was
investigated using measures referring to structural/input
(bed capacity, occupancy rate, nurse staffing) and effi-
ciency (unweighted ALoS, SHI payment per discharge)
differences between hospital providers by ownership
type. Although performance assessment requires a
multi-dimensional approach [58,59], such as that used
in the present study, it has been asserted that outcome
indicators (such as mortality rates, health outcomes, and
patient satisfaction) are stronger quality measures than
are those of input and process [60]. The lack of relevant
data meant that we could not include these useful mea-
sures in our analysis.
Despite the limitations mentioned above, our present
research reveals significant differences in crucial perfor-
mance aspects of PFPs and public hospitals in Greece.
PFP hospital service providers use fewer, and more
poorly qualified, nurses than do public hospitals, regard-
less of hospital specialty or year (2001-2003). This finding
is in agreement with international empirical evidence
showing that PFP providers (including general and psy-
chiatric hospitals, dialysis centers, and nursing homes)
have lower total nurse [61-63] and registered nurse
[62,64,65] staffing levels than do private nonprofit
competitors. In Greece, evidence on nurse staffing level
by hospital ownership type became available for the first
time in 1995 [66], and since then the relevant data were
thought to be non-existent [67]. Several health policy
analysts have sought to explain the 1993 PFP/public
nurse staffing difference as reflecting better staff manage-
ment practices in the private sector. The implication was
that PFP hospitals in Greece used their smaller nursing
staff more efficiently than did public hospitals, without
compromising quality of care [68,69]. International evi-
dence shows that the need to maximize profits forces
PFP providers to minimize expenditure on nursing, and
especially on highly qualified nurses, a practice related in
many instances to poor healthcare outcomes [27,31,64].
Understaffing of PFP clinics owing to diversion of funds
from clinical needs to profit is the most obvious explana-
tion of the surprisingly low nurse staffing rates in PFP
hospitals found in our present study.
We also found that the unweighted ALoS values in
most cases were higher in PFP clinics than in public hos-
pitals (regardless of hospital specialty or year of study
according to SHI data, only in general and specialized
hospitals according to NSS data). We accept, of course,
that ALoS is highly dependent on illness severity, and the
lack of case mix adjustment (because the relevant data
were not available) constitutes a serious limitation of our
study. Nevertheless, based on the consensus among
health policy researchers that the most severely ill
patients in Greece are treated in the public sector
[47,67,69], one would have expected the result to be the
opposite of what was observed.
Additionally, we consistently found that ALoS of PFP
clinics was significantly higher when calculated using SHI
data compared to calculations using NSS data. This diver-
gence in ALoS of private hospitals between the two data
sources probably reflects the fact that SHI dataset includes
only discharged patients whose public insurance fund
compensate the hospital on a per diem basis, excluding at
the same time private patients or private insured patients
who compensate the hospital on a fixed per discharge
basis. International empirical evidence has shown that
hospital reimbursement on a per diem basis creates incen-
tives for private profit maximizing hospitals to increase
length of patient stay, longer than medically required [37].
This observation of our study raises ethical concerns
whether supplier-induced demand plays a role in the
Greek private hospital sector and needs further investiga-
tion by future research.
Finally, we found that SHI payment-per-discharge was
significantly higher in PFP clinics compared with public
hospitals, regardless of the year (2001-2003) of study or
the SHI scheme evaluated. This is in agreement with inter-
national empirical evidence; payments for care are higher
in PFP hospitals than in private nonprofit institutions [30].
Kondilis et al. BMC Health Services Research 2011, 11:234
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do the Greek SHI schemes evaluated in the current study.
The evidence shows that higher payments to PFP hospital
providers are attributable to malpractice including upcod-
ing of diagnosis-related groups [15], formal and informal
relationships with outpatient suppliers of healthcare ser-
vices such as skilled nursing facilities and home healthcare
[16,70], and incentives that depend on the method of
reimbursement associated with an increase in the average
length of stay (as has been shown in contracted rehabilita-
tion hospitals) [71]. In the case of the Greek SHI funds
studied here, the most likely explanation of the higher pay-
ment per discharge to PFP hospital providers seems to be
either an increase in the ALoS charged by private clinics
or the excessive use of diagnostic services, the reimburse-
ment of which is not included in the fixed per diem fee.
Our results indicate that if the three SHI schemes
included in our sample had directed all of their hospita-
lized beneficiaries to public rather than PFP hospitals,
they could have saved 122.2 million Euros in 2003 and
more than 304 million Euros during the 3-year period
examined in the present study. This finding is of particu-
lar interest especially in the context of the current eco-
nomic crisis that manifested in Greece in the form of
public-debt crisis; since it implies that public administra-
tion’s incompetence to formulate a comprehensive and
mandatory system of data submission caused a constant
money flow from public funds to private providers, that
contributed to the dramatic deterioration in Greece’s
public accounts.
Conclusions
In a mixed European healthcare system (such as that of
Greece), significant performance differences are evident
between PFP and public hospital service providers, in
terms of several indicators such as average bed capacity,
average occupancy rate, nurse staffing rates, average
length of patient stay, and SHI payment per discharge.
The public hospital sector performed better than did PFP
competitors in terms of all measures included in our
study. Our findings do not mean that the performance or
quality of care at most public facilities in Greece is excel-
lent or even adequate. Rather, most of our findings, in
agreement with international empirical evidence, raise
the concern that for-profit ownership of hospital facilities
negatively affects the quality and cost of patient care.
Close monitoring and continuous comparative assess-
ment of healthcare providers by ownership type, a
research and policy practice neglected in most European
countries and almost unknown to date in Greece, can
offer useful data facilitating rational health policy deci-
sions on the appropriate balance of, or even the need
for, a public/private hospital mix.
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